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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANCISCO ROSA CAMACHO,

\

Plaintiff, I
— vs. —

1

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION V
OF UTAH, and
/

Case No.
7518

KENNECOTT COPPER COMPANY,
(Utah Copper Division)
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action is an original proceeding in this court. The
plaintiff asks the court to review the decision of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah and to find that
the decision and findings of fact are not supported by any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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substantial evidence and are contrary to the evidence presented to the Commission, and are contrary to law*
Camacho was employed by the Kennecott Copper
Company, Utah Copper Division, as a trackman on September 15, 1946 (record P. 104)- Prior to that time he
had worked as an agricultural employee on a farm in Glassboro, New Jersey, (R. 104) for two months and prior to
coming to New Jersey as a waiter and soda fountain worker
in Puerto Rico for seventeen years and ten months (R.
104). The plaintiff is a Puerto Rican and speaks Spanish.
He does not speak English, and it was necessary to obtain
his testimony at the hearing through the use of an interpreter. On the day he was employed by Kennecott, Camacho was examined by a company doctor at Bingham for
the express purpose of determining his physical fitness
for employment (R. pp. 95 and 102). The examining physician reported as a result of this examination: "Appearance: okay . . . hands and arms: okay . . . spine and joints:
okay . . . chest, abdomen and groin: okay . . . " (R. 102).
The examining physician made no remarks under the
heading "defects that disqualify" or "defects that do not
disqualify" or "kind of work not allowed." He stated instead "I certify that I have carefully examined the applicant named herein, and that the foregoing is a correct
description of his physical condition. As a result of my
examination, I find that he does possess all of the requirements of health in body, mind and special senses necessary for the position of
" R. 103)
Between the time of his employment in September
and the date of the injury, October 30, 1946, plaintiff
worked as a trackman. Part of his duties consisted of work
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with a pick and shovel. A share of his time was spent
stacking railroad ties. These ties weigh approximately 150
pounds and they are piled in stacks of one hundred each.
By the time the top of the stack is reached workers must
lift the ties in a position over their heads. The plaintiff and
two fellow workers testified that plaintiff was able to and
did in fact lift ties of this kind over his head regularly
during the first six weeks of this employment (R. 46-47,
49-50,52).
O n October 30th, 1946, plaintiff was unloading ties
from a box car at Bingham. A pick which he was using
as a lever forcing a tie out of a pile inside a boxcar slipped
and the plaintiff lost his balance and fell backwards striking his back and left shoulder on a pile of ties (R. 50-53).
He was lowered from the boxcar and taken to the emergency hospital and from there to St. Mark's Hospital in
Salt Lake City.
Upon arrival at the hospital he was examined by an
intern and then by Doctor W . M. Pugh, Medical Adviser
for the Kennecott Company. Dr. Pugh testified - "He could
not talk too well, but he indicated the site of his pain as
the lower right side and back of his scapular area and the
shoulder area on the left side." (R. 70). There were two
sets of X-ray pictures taken at the hospital, the second set
being taken after the first showed there was something
wrong with the left shoulder joint (R. 70-71). Particularly
the second set of X-rays taken showed that there was a
pre-existing disease of the left shoulder joint (R. 81). O n
October 31, 1946, Dr. A. J. Wilson, the X-ray specialist
at St. Mark's Hospital, reported to Dr. Pugh, as a result
of the second X-rays, that there was a fracture of the left
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second rib (R. 105), The X-rays show the place of the
fracture to be approximately two inches from the joint
itself (R. 91)- The Commission did not include any of
the X-rays with the record certified to this Court.
Camacho was treated at the hospital for about ten
days and then after a short rest returned to work at Bingham at the suggestion of Dr. Pugh and the Company doctors (R. 85). Upon his return to the track gang he could
not do the heavy work lifting ties, but asked for and was
given lighter tasks. He was able to perform light work,
but he had a persistent pain in his left shoulder. The pain
continued from the time of the injury until the examination, and Camacho testified that he has had gradually less
motion in his joint (R. 54)- Since returning to work, Camacho has never had full use of his shoulder. At first he
worked with a pick and shovel, but more recently he has
been a waterboy (R. 54-56). Neither the pick and shovel
work nor the waterboy job involved the use of the shoulder
joint (R. 57-58).
Applicant's theory was that, when he went to work
for Kennecott, there was a quiescent diseased condition of
the left shoulder, but it caused no pain, and there was full
use of the shoulder. The accident of October 30, 1946, accelerated and lighted up the condition, and over a period
of several months resulted in almost complete atrophy and
loss of function of the joint. The Court's attention is invited to the applicant's medical testimony (R. 23-44, 5758), the medical theories of which the Commission says it
does not question (R. 17).

V
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The Commission correctly states the issues to be:
L Did applicant sustain an injury to his left shoulder?
2. If so, did that injury aggravate the pre-existing
shoulder disease and cause the pre-existing muscle atrophy
in whole or in part? (See decision R. 17) The positions
taken by the Company doctors at the hearing were that the
same condition existed as to limitation of motion and function of the shoulder prior to the injury as exists at the present time, and that there was no injury to the shoulder whatever at the time of the accident.
Because plaintiff and applicant takes the position that
the findings of the Commission in conformity with these
two positions by the Company are unsupported by any
substantial evidence, the testimony of the doctors is not
recited more completely in the statement of facts. It is the
position of Camacho, that the Company's own evidence
does not support and is contrary to these theories, and that
the Commission bases part of its primary findings upon
pure and simple hearsay evidence; that other findings are
based upon testimony completely impeached and self-contradicted, and that findings based upon this kind of evidence are improper as a matter of law.
STATEMENT O F POINTS RELIED U P O N
POINT I. The Commission is not authorized to make
findings based solely on hearsay evidence and any such
findings are not supported by substantial evidence as a
matter of law.
POINT II. The testimony of Dr. Pugh upon which
the Decision of the Commission was based was self-con-
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tradicted and impeached upon cross examination; it was
therefore not substantial evidence, and findings of fact
based upon such evidence are contrary to law.
POINT III. The findings of the Commission that
there was no injury to the shoulder and that the present
condition pre-existed the accident are not supported by any
substantial evidence and are contrary to the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COMMISSION IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE FINDINGS BASED SOLELY
ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND ANY SUCH FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
It is recognized, of course, that under the modern
theory of the nature of the quasi-judicial agencies and their
function in determination of various kinds of problems
in connection generally with administrative law, the classic
hearsay rule has lost a great deal of its former effect and
significance. Hearsay is almost uniformly held to be admissible in hearings before Commissions such as the Industrial Commission of this state. Plaintiff concedes for the
purpose of argument in this case that hearsay testimony is
admissible. However, it is a very different thing to say that
it is admissible and to contend that findings based upon
hearsay are based upon substantial evidence.
The question of the admissibility of evidence is certainly a different question from the determination of the
weight of the evidence one admitted. Probably no lawyer
would contend that such a statement as "J°lin told Mary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that Dick told her that he (Dick) saw a flying saucer"
produced out of the mouth of John would be substantial
evidence. Yet, it is not certain that such a statement would
be inadmissible in a hearing before the Industrial Commission. The distinction was recently pointed out by a
Federal Court:
"The statute says that the findings shall be
conclusive if supported by evidence, but this is in
paragraph (e), section 10, 29 U. S. C. A. 160 (e),
which is dealing with the controversy after it has
reached the judicial state. The word "evidence" in
this connection refers to the means by which any alleged matter of fact is established or disproved in a
court of justice. That the evidence must be material
is indicated in the very next sentence; that it must
also be competent and relevant is the general rule
which remains in effect in the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary. There is nothing in the
act to indicate that the conclusion of the Board as
to the fit and appropriate proof in the particular
case should be conclusive.
"It is elementary that questions respecting the
competency and admissibility of evidence are entirely distinct from those which relate to its tSect
or sufficiency; the former being exclusively for the
court, the latter exclusively for the jury. If the Board
should base its findings solely upon evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search, the order resting thereon would be invalid, because such evidence
is incompetent. Other illustrations might be given,
but it is unnecessary to belabor the point.
"The provision in paragraph (b), section 10,
29 U. S. C. A. 160 (b) with reference to the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
not being controlling, means that it is not error for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
the Board to hear incompetent evidence. It does not
mean that a finding of fact may rest solely upon
such evidence. Whether there be any competent evidence to support the findings of the Board is a question of law; whether it is sufficient is a question of
fact. The decision of the Board upon a question of
law is not conclusive in this court. (National Labor
Relations Board v. Bell Oil and Gas Co., 98 F. (2d)
870,871.)
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated
that, as a matter of law, findings of an administrative tribunal based solely on hearsay are not based upon substantial evidence:
"The companies urge that the Board received 'remote hearsay 1 and 'mere rumor/ The statute provides that 'rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law or equity shall not be controlling/ The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird,
194 U. S. 25, 44, 48 L. ed. 860, 869, 24 S. Ct. 563;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N.
R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 57 L. ed. 431, 434, 33 S.
Ct. 185; United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265
U. S. 274, 288, 68 L. ed. 1016, 1022, 44 S. Ct. 565;
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S.
420, 442, 74 L. ed. 524, 535, 50 S. Ct. 220. But
this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.''
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(Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National
Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 83 L. Ed,
126,59 Sup. Ct. 206.)
In the case at bar, the Commission puts great emphasis upon and bases part of its findings upon a surgical
report of Dr. Pugh, dated October 30, 1946, and filed
with the Commission November 13, 1946, in which Dr.
Pugh stated:
"Fell on back while at work. X-rays show old deforming disease of left shoulder with restriction
of motion. Fracture left rib, also evidence of foreign substance pre-existing in right hip area. Fracture right transverse process third lumbar vertebrae."
The Commission states: " W e have no reason to disbelieve that report. We are compelled to find that 'deforming disease with restriction of motion' was present on the
day of the injury, October 30th, 1946." The Commission
refers to Dr. Pugh's report several times in its decision
stating in one place "at that time no one contemplated that
a dispute would arise and, therefore, we find no basis for
rejecting the report of Dr. Pugh." It is apparent that a
great deal of weight was given to it.
This report of Dr. Pugh is pure and simple and patent
self-serving hearsay and while it may be admissible, it is
absolutely fallacious for the Commission to base its decision upon it. W h a t Dr. Pugh says to the Commission in
1946 is as much hearsay as what Dr. Pugh would say to
John Doe concerning the accident. With due respect to Dr.
Pugh's medical ability, it is a well-known fact that he has
been employed by Kennecott Copper Company for years,
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both as a physician and surgeon and as a witness before
the Industrial Commission. For the Commission to express its opinion that a statement by him to the Commission itself six weeks after an industrial accident, is made
"at a time no one contemplated that a dispute would arise''
is absolutely absurd. Dr. Pugh's business is to foresee the
possibility of disputes, and to protect the Company against
their consequences. Self-made evidence should be viewed
with caution by the Commission instead of being made the
basis of findings. The rule applied in this case would give
every insurer under the Act an unmistakable advantage
over injured employees simply by filing favorable reports
before a claim for compensation is made. At the hearing
Commissioner Weiseley took pains to point out that the
opinion of the medical advisory board was not evidence
and not to be considered as evidence by the Commission
(R. 25). Yet the Commission bases its decision upon the
self-serving report to it of a doctor paid by Kennecott Copper Company. Applicant will point in the brief the number of times that the self-made evidence of Dr. Pugh was
completely impeached during the course of the hearing.
The point we wish to make to the court at this time,
however, is that insofar as the decision of the Commission is based upon this hearsay report, whether or not such
evidence was impeached is not based on substantial evidence and is contrary to law.
POINT II. THE TESTIMONY OF DR. PUGH
UPON WHICH THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION WAS BASED, WAS SELF-CONTRADICTED
AND IMPEACHED UPON CROSS EXAMINATION;
IT WAS THEREFORE NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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DENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT BASED UPON
SUCH EVIDENCE ARE CONTRARY TO LAW.
Outside of the first surgical report filed with the Commission on November 13, 1946, the bulk of the findings of
fact are based upon the testimony of Dr. Pugh to the effect
that the present disability existed at the time of the injury
on October 30, 1946, and that there was no injury to the
shoulder at the time of the accident. The position of the
employer and of Dr. Pugh was stated by the doctor in narrative from beginning at Page 75 of the record. He first
makes the statement "nowhere, at the hospital or from my
personal observation, or anyone in our organization, was
there any evidence of a blow or an injury to the left shoulder." (R. 75). The following statements were made, however, by Dr. Pugh indicating that Camacho did display
pain of the left shoulder at the time he was examined in
the hospital. Dr. Pugh stated that the first thing he did,
when Camacho arrived at the hospital, was to examine him
physically to ascertain how he was injured and "whether
an X-ray over the area might indicate anything." In response to a question as to whether Camacho told him what
had happened, Dr. Pugh stated, "He could not talk too well,
but he indicated the site of his pain as the lower right
side and back of his scapular area and the shoulder area
on the left side."
X-rays were taken at the time of this examination. The
first X-rays were of Camacho's chest and spine and when
these X-rays indicated that something was wrong with the
left shoulder joint, further X-rays were requested. The condition of the bone and joints was not sufficiently indicated
by the examination to suspect that there was anything
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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wrong with the shoulder. The fact is perfectly clear from
the most cursory look at Camacho at the present time,
without his shirt, that there is something wrong with his
left shoulder. His entire left shoulder and arm down to
the elbow are nothing but skin and bones. If the present
condition had existed at the time of this examination, certainly X-ray would not be required before the condition
was suspected.
Dr. Pugh states in his explanation that the condition at the present time is the same as it was at the time
of his examination in 1946 (R. 78). He read into the record the report of the intern at the hospital. The intern's
notations admittedly do not indicate anything abnormal
in the appearance of the shoulder joint. On cross examination this series of questions and answers occurred: (R. 78)
Q

May I see that hospital report? Doctor, are you
head of the Medical Staff of the Kennecott Copper Company?

A

I am associated with it.

Q

You are acquainted with the kind of physical
examination that men receive when they go to
work?

A

Yes.

Q

So far as that examination goes, you usually
have them bend down and touch their toes,
don't you?

A

That may or may not be required or asked for.

Q

They are generally required to raise their hands
above their heads?

A

I would not say that.
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Q

At any rate they are given a very thorough phy**
sical examination, aren't they?

A

Yes, but a man with a shoulder like that, he can
bring his arm up to forty-five degrees and use
his forearm and elbow and all that. He could
mask a thing of that kind.

Q

Do you usually pass a man with muscular
atrophy?

A

Ordinarily not.

Q

When a man comes to the hospital, if it is
muscular atrophy, would that be unusual for
the intern not to make a notation of it on his
physical examination?

A

Not necessarily.

Q

You think it is a normal thing?

A
Q

Oh, this man was looking for an injury.
If a man comes in and was complaining of pain
in the upper part of his back and chest, and he
had very marked atrophy of the shoulder muscles, would it be unusual for him not to make
a notation?
A Yes. But on the other hand he did order X-ray
pictures of his chest.
Q He made no notation of anything unusual
about the left shoulder?
A No, I don't see any.
Q But he did say severe tenderness over the ribs
and in the left scapula?
A Yes.
Dr. Pugh states that Camacho never complained to
any hospital personnel about pain in his shoulder, and yet
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he admits that Camacho spoke Spanish and little, if any,
English. He does not know whether the hospital nurses and
interns speak Spanish. (R. 81) Dr. Pugh's testimony and
the report of the intern affirmatively state that the left
shoulder area was indicated by Camacho as being painful.
No mention, perhaps, need be made of the obvious fact
that Dr. Pugh doesn't know what Camacho said during
the hours that the Doctor wasn't there. In fairness, and as
a matter of law, how can the Commission give any probative force to such testimony?
It is pointed out in this connection that on the day
the second X-rays were taken of Camacho's shoulder, the
roentgenologist reported to Dr. Pugh " additional study of
the dorsal spine, thorax, and left shoulder confirms the
presence of the left second rib fracture." The common experience of men is that a blow sufficient to fracture a rib
two inches from a joint would produce pain in the area
of the joint. Can a finding to the contrary be said to be
based on substantial evidence?
In the fact of these statements by Dr. Pugh on direct
and cross examination, the Commission found that Camacho did not complain of any pain in his left shoulder at
the time he went to the hospital and that there was no
injury of the left shoulder. It is admitted that no bruises or
abrasions were discovered in this area on examination, but
this Court can take cognizance of a matter of such common knowledge that injuries and blows, and even fractures, most often do not produce bruises or abrasions. The
Court certainly must conclude that there is no substantial
evidence to support the Commission's finding that there
was no injury to the shoulder. All of the evidence, includDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing the Company's own records, and the hospital records,
shows that the shoulder was injured and that Camacho
complained of the injured shoulder.
The second major finding of the Commission was that
the condition of the left shoulder joint pre-existed the injury and that the injury did not aggravate the condition,
and that the entire disability pre-existed before the injury.
Here, again, the testimony of Dr. Pugh is relied upon. Admittedly Dr. Pugh testified, on direct examination and in
his narrative statement, that the same condition exists in
the shoulder now as existed at the time of his examination
on October 30, 1946. The Court's attention is invited to
the contradictory and impeaching statements made by Dr.
Pugh on cross examination. He stated that Camacho was
examined by a Company doctor six weeks before the time
of the injury and that no indication was made in the physician's report of any unusual appearance of the left shoulder or any disability. He does not deny that it is customary
for a man being examined to be required to place his hands
over hi s head and to touch his feet with his hands. He admits that it would be very unusual for a man in Camacho's i resent condition to be passed by a medical examiner.
He ad nits that a man with muscular atrophy would ordinari. y not be passed. He admits that it would be unusual
for ar intern not to make a notation of muscular atrophy
as s k w n by the present examination and that the intern
did nv t make such a notation at the time of his examination.
He a.lmits that the man has at least 75% permanent disability of the left arm at the present time, and that only six
weeks before injury he was certified by Company doctors
as being physically qualified for the job.
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The second X-rays showing the condition of the left
shoulder joint were not taken until after the first X-rays
indicated there was something wrong with the joint. Certainly the marked atrophy at the present time was not existing at the time he entered the hospital As heretofore stated,
the man's left shoulder and arm was nothing but skin and
bones. It would be the first thing any doctor would see
upon examination. The man cannot lift his arm except that
he has enough motion to put his left hand to his mouth,
Dr, Pugh admits that in the disease of the type here complained of it is not unusual for the condition to exist for
a number of years in a quiescent state (R, 82) and that a
blow to the shoulder area would light up or accelerate
the condition, (R. 87) Dr, Pugh, himself, seems to place
some importance on the fact that there is no change in the
condition of the bones as shown by the X-rays between October, 1946, and the time of the evidence before the Commission, However, he admits that the bone condition is all
that the X-rays show and that the X-rays do not determine
disability. He hedges about a blow accelerating the condition shown by the 1946 X-rays, but he could hardly deny
anything so perfectly obvious even to the unexpert observer, (R, 87-89)
Dr, Q, B. Coray, who was produced as the X-ray expert for the Kennecott Company, also stated on cross examination that the X-rays do not show anything about the
soft tissues, (R, 64) He admitted that the disease of tuberculosis in the joint or tubercular arthritis can exist for a
long period of time without any discomfort to the patient,
(R, 65) He admits that the X-rays taken October, 1946, do
not prove anything about the amount of use that Camacho
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had of his shoulder. (R. 65) He states that it is not possible to make a diagnosis of the degree of disability from
the X-ray. (R. 66) The following question and answer is
of particular interest: (R. 68)
Q

Dr. Coray, it is perfectly possible, is it not, to
have an increase in the disability, if any disability existed in 1946 at the time that first
film shows, which would not show in the second X-rays?

A

Yes, that is medically so, and very logical.

It is submitted that these statements of Dr. Pugh and
Dr. Coray, both of defendant's witnesses, entirely refute
the finding of the Commission to the effect that the disability now claimed pre-existed the injury. Both doctors
for defendant testified, in substance, and effect, that a man
could have the condition shown by the X-rays of October,
1946, and still have no disability. Camacho and two disinterested witnesses produced by Camacho testified that in
fact Camacho did have full use of his shoulder. We admit
that the X-rays of 1946 show a pre-existing disease. The
fact that the disease is there does not show that there was
a disability. All of the medical experts in the case agree that
a blow to the shoulder, diseased as Camacho's shoulder was
in October, 1946, would tend to result in muscular atrophy
and loss of function. That is precisely the position that
plaintiff takes with reference to the evidence. Dr. Ershler
stated that in his opinion and as a result of his consultation that was what happened.
It is submitted that there is no medical opinion in the
record which denies that the plaintiff's theory is sound, assuming the fact to be that the plaintiff had the use of his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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left arm at the time he entered the employment of the defendant and between then and the time of the injury. The
question of fact to be decided, therefore, is whether plaintiff was able to use his arm. Plaintiff established the physical
fact that he had the use of the arm prior to the injury by
three witnesses, including himself, and it is corroborated
by the records of Kennecott itself. Opinion evidence, contrary to established physical facts, is not substantial evidence. The Utah case in point is: Haarstick v. Oregon
Short Line Railroad Co., (1927) 70 Ut. 552, 262 Pac. 100;
and see Owen v. Appalachian Power Co., (1915) 78 W.
Va. 596, 89 S. E. 262. The cases holding evidence of physical facts and capability to be superior to opinion evidence are numerous. Even, therefore, if there was opinion
evidence contrary to the proof of plaintiff that he was able
to put his hands above his head, it could not justify the rejection of the evidence of physical facts.
It is to be noted that even if it was a fact that there
was restriction of motion at the time of Dr. Pugh's first
medical report, as is contended in the hearsay evidence referred to under Point I of this brief, that report was issued
after the accident. It does not tend to show that there ivas
any limitation of motion before the accident. It is perfectly
logical to infer that if a man with a diseased shoulder joint
of the kind Camacho had in 1946 received a blow to the
shoulder, he would have difficulty in moving it that he did
not have before the blow. Dr. Pugh's report, therefore,
has little, if any, probative weight for this reason, as well as
for the reason that it is hearsay. It is to be noted that while
Dr. Pugh testified at the hearing that he had the same
amount of atrophy now as he had on October 30, 1946,
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he did not even mention atrophy in his report, nor did the
intern in his report. Moreover, he sent the man back to
work and admits that a man in Camacho's present condition should not be hired or working*
It is submitted to the court that, in view of these admissions on cross examination of Dr. Pugh and Dr. Winter,
it cahnot be said that Dr. Pugh's statements to the contrary
on direct examination are substantial evidence to sustain
the Commission's finding.
POINT III. THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION THAT THERE WAS NO INJURY TO THE
SHOULDER AND THAT THE PRESENT CONDITION PRE-EXISTED THE ACCIDENT ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.
We have discussed in some detail the testimony of Dr.
Pugh and although it is, of course, pertinent here we shall
not repeat what we have previously referred to concerning
the inconsistencies of his statements. Plaintiff's position is
that if a witness says on direct examination, "I saw conditions A, B and C," and on cross examination admits
that he did not see conditions A, B and C, and that he was
in no position to see them, as a matter of law, a finding to
the effect that the witness saw conditions A, B and C is
not supported by any substantial evidence. This principle
of law is perfectly obvious in application to the facts in the
present case. The Commission has seized upon the most
favorable statements made by Dr. Pugh and Dr. Coray on
their direct examination, and the most favorable implications that could be drawn from these statements, despite
the fact that they were substantially contradicted in their
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cross examination. It seems clear in principle that the very
purpose of cross examination is to see whether a witness's
testimony will withstand the test of scrutiny and inquiry.
Unless a party is bound by statements of his witnesses on
cross examination, the entire purpose and meaning of cross
examination is lost. It would be a different situation if
there was any other evidence to support the propositions
found by the Commission, but it cannot be contended in
the present case that there is any evidence other than the
statements of Dr. Pugh to substantiate the findings of the
Commission. No other evidence was produced. The Company did not even attempt to prove that Camacho was
unable to lift ties over his head when he went to work. Certainly it was within their power to produce such evidence,
if it existed. The Company certainly cannot deny that
Camacho received an injury on October 30, 1946. The
Company's own records and the hospital records indicate
-that the shoulder was the site of the injury. Of course, the f
X-rays shown at the hospital establish a pre-existing disease. It is probable that even Camacho did not know of
the diseased condition of his joint. It is not for either the
Commission or the Court to speculate whether the disease
would have produced disability, if there had been no blow
on the shoulder. This Court has repeatedly held that an
employer takes an employee as he is with all of his physical weaknesses, and if it happens that by reason of some
condition he is more susceptible to injury than a perfect
physical specimen that is the risk taken by the employer
under the theory of workman's compensation legislation.
In Utah-Idaho Central Railroad Co. of Utah et al v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, (1928) 71 Utah 490, 267
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Pac. 785, the Court said:
"It thus appears that from whatever angle we view
the testimony whether the condition of permanent
partial disability resulted from the accident or resulted from a pre-existing condition the applicant is
entitled to compensation. A latent disease or trouble, if accelerated or lighted up by an industrial accident and a more serious injury results by reason
of the fact of the existence of such latent ailment
than otherwise would in a normal recovery from injuries received from or in an accident, in such case
the injured employee is entitled to additional compensation.' ' Pinyon Queen Min. Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 323; Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206
P. 278; Milford Copper Co. of Utah v. Industrial
Commission, 61 Utah 37, 210 P. 993; McEwan v.
Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 585, 217 P. 690;
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission,
63 Utah 59, 221 P. 852.
And in Pinyon Queen Mining Co. et at v. Industrial
Commission of Utah (1922) 59 Utah 402, 204 Pac. 323,
the Court holds squarely that aggravation of a pre-existing
condition is compensable. The Commission in that case had
concluded: that the employer takes a man as he is, and
therefore should pay compensation for the full period of
disability . . . " even though without the pre-existing syphiletic condition there would have been no dire consequences
of the accident. Numerous Utah cases are to the same
effect.
All of the facts in this case, including the testimony
on cross examination of the defendant's own witnesses,
shows that the injury of October 30, 1946, lighted up and
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accelerated and contributed to the present disability of Camacho. All of the evi3ence shows that Camacho had had
the use of his shoulder in October of 1946. All of the evidence shows that he received a blow to his shoulder in October, 1946. The intent, purpose and effect of such delegation of authority as is found in the Workmen's Compensation Act of this State, is to vest in the Industrial Commission wide discretion in dealing with such matters of
weighing of testimony and attributing casual connections
from events to conditions. With the theory of such legislation there can be no quarrel, but when, as in this case,
the Commission disregards elementary legal principles, and
bases its decision upon a combination of hearsay and impeached testimony, the Court should not hesitate to hold
that the Commission has exceeded its authority. A litigant
in the Commission should have no less a right to be put out
of court, if he is to be out, by evidence of real, probative,
and rational force, than in any other judicial proceeding.
It is submitted that this Court should enter an order
vacating and setting aside the decision of the Commission
and that the Commission should be instructed to determine
the amount of disability of the plaintiff as between 75%
and 90%, and that the Court should determine, as a matter
of law, that the Commission's decision and the findings
of fact therein contained are not supported by any substantial evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE M. McMILLAN
Attorney for Plaintiff,
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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